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I. INTRODUCTION

On May 26, 2007, the Wall Street Journal reported that a popular and historically entrenched tax deferral tool is in trouble. ' The
tool-a section 1031 exchange-allows taxpayers to defer taxation
on the capital gains received from selling investment property as
long as the proceeds from the sale are reinvested in like-kind
property within a certain time period. In many instances, the
taxpayer employs a qualified intermediary, who plays the important role of key middleman in the exchange. Recently, more than
one of these key middlemen has run into financial trouble, leaving
2
the taxpayer it served with nothing to exchange.
The qualified intermediary ("QI" or "qualified intermediary")
plays the role of cash-holder in deferred multiparty section 1031
exchanges, because to qualify for section 1031 treatment, the
"seller can't touch the money from the sale." 3 In essence the QI
holds onto the seller's cash until it can be used to purchase new
4
investment property.
Qualified intermediaries are generally banks or title insurance
companies. However, the business is largely unregulated under
1. Peter Lattman & Kemba Dunham, Tax Strategy For Real Estate Hits Rocky Turf,
WALL ST. J., May 26, 2007, at B1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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the tax code. 5 Light regulation means that when the intermediary
has his hands on the money, he can do almost whatever he wants
with it, within the bounds of his agreement with the taxpayer, of
6
course.
Out of this framework flows the sad story of the taxpayer whose
intermediary lost or stole his funds. According to the Wall Street
Journal,recent months have seen "at least two big cases of independent QIs running into trouble." 7 One case involved the alleged
misappropriation of over $95 million of customers' exchange funds
to fund other business and personal activities. 8 Another highly
publicized case involved "1031 Tax Group LLC," which filed for
bankruptcy protection on May 14, 2007, owing an estimated $151
million in exchange funds to over 300 investors. 9 To put a face on
the problem, the Wall Street Journal told the story of Ms. Graham:
Candace Graham, a real-estate investor from Portola Valley,
Calif., is owed roughly $3.3 million by 1031 Tax Group, according to a bankruptcy court filing. In February, Ms. Graham, 58 years old, sold an office building and, to defer taxes,
placed the proceeds with a subsidiary of the 1031 Tax Group
but hasn't been able to gain access to the funds to buy another
property. Because her deferral strategy fell apart, she faces
the prospect of a capital-gains bill. "I have no idea how I will
pay the government now," said Ms. Graham.1 0
Ms. Graham's story raises legal issues that go beyond the question of increased regulation of qualified intermediaries.1 1 If Ms.
Graham's funds (the money from the sale of the relinquished
property) are not restored in time for her to make a legitimate sec-

5. Id.
6. Lattman & Dunham, supra note 1, at B1. For example, the Code does not impose
any licensing requirements on the Qualified Intermediary. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. Donald McGhan allegedly took exchange funds belonging to over 130 clients of
his qualified intermediary businesses, partly to finance his investment in a company that
manufactures silicone breast implants. Id.
9. Id. The company's owner allegedly borrowed money from the company to fund real
estate investments made by another company he controlled. Id.
10. Lattman & Dunham, supra note 1.
11. Id. The IRS has taken note of the obvious issue (i.e., the 1031 taxpayer whose QI
lost his money probably cannot satisfy the 180-day exchange requirement). Id. Clarissa
Potter, Deputy Chief Counsel of the IRS, reported to the Wall Street Journal that the
agency is following the trouble, and that it has taken due notice that "taxpayers may face
disruptions when an intermediary cannot meet its obligations." Id.
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tion 1031 exchange, will she be taxed on the sale of the relinquished property? The issue is one of first impression in the context of like-kind exchanges, a Code section where taxpayers must
adhere to strict rules in order to get a deferral. Further, if Ms.
Graham is taxed, to what extent is she taxed, and when? This
comment will answer these questions.
The answer lies in a synchronization of the Internal Revenue
Code's rules governing section 1031 exchanges and case law regarding a principal's realization of income where his agent misappropriates his funds. The comment begins with an exploration of
section 1031, its evolution, and the role of the qualified intermediary within its framework. Next, it focuses on the rules regarding
a principal's realization of misappropriated funds. In the analysis
section, the writer synchronizes the two aforementioned areas into
a rule to be applied to Ms. Graham. Finally, in the conclusion, the
rule is applied to Ms. Graham's situation.
II. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 1031
Under the Internal Revenue Code, "gross income means all income from whatever source derived," including gains from "dealings in property.'12 Generally, one's taxable income is calculated
by subtracting his adjustments and deductions from his gross income. 13 The gain or loss from any dealing in property is the
amount realized 14 from the sale or disposition of the property, less
the adjusted basis 15 provided by the Code for computing gain or
loss.16

There are exceptions to the aforementioned framework. A taxpayer can sell property in two different ways under the Code
without having to realize a gain, which in turn means he does not

12. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000).
13. Id. § 63. Knowledge of the rules regarding adjustments and deductions are not
necessary for the reader of this comment.
14. The amount realized is generally equal to the amount of money received from the
sale or disposition of property, plus the fair market value of other property received. Id. §
1001(b).

15. The adjusted basis for the purposes of this comment is generally equal to the property's basis-which is its cost-adjusted for depreciation and/or improvements. See, e.g., id.
§§ 1011(a), 1012. The Code has special rules for computing the basis of specific things like
gifts and property received from a decedent, but these rules are not relevant to this comment.
16. Id. § 1001(a).
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have to pay taxes on the gross income he received from the sale.17
One such exclusion is Code section 12118, which allows a taxpayer
to exclude from gross income the gain he derived from the sale of
his principal residence. 19
Another exclusion is provided in section 1031(a) of the Code,
which states that "no gain or loss is recognized on the exchange of
property held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment if the property is exchanged solely for property of like
kind that is to be held either for productive use in a trade or business or for investment. ' 20 Under this framework, a taxpayer can
avoid realizing a gain on the property he is giving up (the "relinquished property") if he exchanges it for like-kind 2' property (the
"replacement property"), as long as he complies with certain timing parameters 22 and both properties are held for the productive
23
use in a trade or business or for investment.
It is important to understand that the like-kind exchange is a
tax deferral device, not a tax elimination device. 24 The taxpayer's
basis in the replacement property is equal to his basis in the relinquished property, reduced by any cash received and any loss
recognized and increased by any gain recognized. 25 In other
words, section 1031 lets the taxpayer delay taxation on the gain
17. See Robert L. Cherry, Jr., Use of a Qualified Intermediary for 1031 Tax Free Exchanges; Sell Real Estate and Pay No Tax, 33 REAL EST. L.J. 239 (2004). This comment
deals only with gains from the sale of property; losses are beyond its scope.
18. I.R.C. § 121 (2000).
19. Cherry, supra note 17, at 239.
20. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (2000). However, the rule does not apply to gains derived from
the exchange of stocks, bonds, notes, other securities, partnership interests, certificates of
trust or beneficial interests, or choses in action. Id. § 1031(a)(2).
21. See id. § 1031(a)(1). The 'like-kind" requirement is interpreted liberally. According
to the Treasury Regulations, the words 'like-kind" reference the nature or character of the
property, not its grade or quality. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b) (1991). The Regulation goes
on to state alternatively that one kind or class of property is not considered of "like-kind" to
property of a different kind or class. Id. As such, improved and unimproved real estate are
considered like in kind, because their difference lies not in kind or class, but in grade or
quality. Id. Generally, it is safe to assume that "[vlirtually all real property is like-kind
property." Cherry, supra note 17, at 241. That said, for the purposes of this comment, it is
assumed that all property exchanged is real estate and thus fulfills the "like-kind" requirement.
22. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3) (2000). The replacement property must be identified within
forty-five days of the transfer of the relinquished property, and it must be received by taxpayer at the earlier of 180 days from the transfer of the relinquished property, or the
date-inclusive of an extension-of the taxpayer's return for the tax year in which the
transfer of the relinquished property took place. Id.
23. See id. at § 1031(a)(1).
24. See Richard M. Lipton, The 'State of the Art' in Like-Kind Exchanges, 91 J. TAX'N
78, (1999).
25. See I.R.C. § 1031(d) (2000).
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realized from exchanging Property X until he eventually sells his
investment property for something that is not of like kindgenerally cash-but his gain on cashing out is calculated using his
basis in Property X.
A.

The Evolution of Section 1031

Congress' intention behind section 1031 was to permit taxpayers to avoid present tax liability when exchanging one property for
another of like kind, because taxes should not be imposed on a
gain realized where the taxpayer maintains a continuous investment in like-kind property. 26 Originally, Congress assumed that
like-kind exchanges would only apply where Taxpayer 1 and Taxpayer 2 exchanged properties simultaneously, 27 but the law has
evolved to allow multiparty transactions and deferred transactions. 28 Ms. Graham's is a multiparty deferred transaction.
In a multiparty transaction, the Taxpayer sells the relinquished
property to the Buyer, who acquires the replacement property that
the Taxpayer desired from Seller, and the Seller conveys the replacement property to the Taxpayer on behalf of the Buyer. 29 The
IRS originally contended that these three-party exchanges did not
satisfy section 1031, but eventually surrendered after losing in
30
Barker v. Commissioner.
In Barker, the Buyer wanted to buy Blackacre from the Taxpayer and the Taxpayer wanted to buy Whiteacre from a thirdparty Seller. 31 To accomplish the exchange, a fourth party simultaneously acquired both properties, transferred Whiteacre to the
Taxpayer in return for Blackacre, and transferred Blackacre to
the Buyer in exchange for cash. 32 The IRS contended that the
transaction did not amount to a successful section 1031 exchange
because the Taxpayer in essence sold Blackacre and reinvested
33
the proceeds.
The Tax Court analyzed the transaction in Barker against a
backdrop of precedential support for three-party exchanges in
general, and specific judicial approval under section 1031 in situa26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Ravenswood Group v. Fairmont Associates, 736 F. Supp. 1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Cherry, supranote 17, at 241.
Lipton, supra note 24, at 79.
Id.
Id. (citing Barker v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 555 (1980)).
Barker, 74 T.C. at 561-62.
Id.
Id. at 562.
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tions where the Buyer immediately sold the property that Taxpayer transferred to him. 34 The Barker deal had several factors
characteristic to section 1031 exchanges, including the intent to
exchange two properties, the actual transfer of legal title, the simultaneous completion and interdependence of contractual arrangements, and most importantly, the fact that "[the Taxpayer]
did not, or could not, obtain actual or constructive receipt of the
cash proceeds of the sale of [Blackacre] to [Buyer]." 35 However,
the court, in interpreting section 1031, deemed suspect the transitory nature of the transaction and the possibility that the Taxpayer "could have received cash rather than real estate. ' 36 These
weaknesses were not enough to overcome the Taxpayer's argument, mainly because the IRS had already acquiesced to transitory ownership in the context of three-party transactions, and because the interdependence of the transactions made the receipt of
cash by the Taxpayer impossible to accomplish. 37 Thus, multiparty exchanges are presently an accepted form of section 1031
gain deferral.
Section 1031 evolved a second way when deferred transactions
became permissible. These exchanges grew out of the Ninth Circuit decision in Starker v. United States, 38 where the issue was
whether section 1031 required a simultaneous exchange of
deeds. 39 In Starker, the United States argued that all exceptions
to the general rule (that gains and losses are recognized) must be
construed narrowly; they must satisfy both the Code's specific requirements for the exception and the underlying purpose for having the exception. 40
However, the Starker court had difficulty determining what the
underlying purpose for section 1031 really was. 4 1 Plus, section
34. Id. at 562-64.
35. Id. at 564-65.
36. Barker, 74 T.C. at 565.
37. Id. at 566-68.
38. Lipton, supra note 24, at 79 (citing Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th
Cir. 1979)).
39. Starker, 602 F.2d at 1350.
40. Id. at 1352 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b) (1957), which states that nonrecognition of an exchange under the Code is only permissible where the exchange satisfies both
(1) the Code's specific requirements for the exception, and (2) the underlying purpose for
which the exchange is excepted from the general rule).
41. Starker, 602 F.2d at 1352. Legislative history showed that Congress wanted to
eliminate taxing those who did not "cash in on their investments in trade or business property" because liquidity problems would ensue for some taxpayers. Id. However, the Court
noted that the liquidity rationale must be limited because those taxpayers who sell and
reinvest could not defer recognition under § 1031, yet may experience the same liquidity
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1031 had a history of being interpreted liberally. 42 After discounting the government's narrow construction argument, the Starker
court turned to the features that made the taxpayer's transaction
most likely to trigger a gain, including the fact that there had
been a substantial time gap separating the exchange of the
deeds. 43 After citing a single Fifth Circuit case and employing
minimal analysis, the Starker court flatly rejected the IRS re44
quirement that the section 1031 exchange be simultaneous.
Congress acquiesced in 1984 by enacting section 1031(a)(3), which
gives the taxpayer forty-five days to identify the replacement
45
property and 180 days to close on it.
As such, section 1031 evolved from a device for two-party simultaneous exchanges into a device that permits the nonrecognition of
deferred multiparty transactions, and the Treasury Regulations
now provide guidance to taxpayers wishing to complete such
transactions. In fact, the multiparty exchange rules found in the
Regulations have resulted in the creation of an entire industryqualified intermediaries- that "stand ready, willing, and able to
assist taxpayers in completing deferred exchanges that are nontaxable under section 1031."46
B.

The Role of the Qualified Intermediary Under Section 1031

Under the Regulations, a multiparty exchange is given section
1031 treatment-despite the lack of a two-person "exchange"-as
long as the taxpayer adheres to the rules regarding the identification and receipt of the replacement property. 47 However, a gain
may be recognized if the taxpayer actually or constructively receives money or property before he receives the like-kind replacement property. 48
Generally, a taxpayer has actual receipt when he receives the
money or property or its benefit. 49 A taxpayer has constructive
problems. Id. Another § 1031 aim of Congress was apparently to address the difficulty of
valuing property that was exchanged. Id. However, the recognition of even $1 in boot
would necessitate a valuation, so the valuation rationale could not have been the main
reason for the enactment of § 1031. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1353.
44. Id. at 1354-55 (citing Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir.
1968)).
45. See Lipton, supranote 24, at 79.
46. Id.
47. Treas. Reg § 1.1031(k)-l(a) (2002).
48. Id.
49. Treas. Reg § 1.1031(k)-l(f)(2) (2002).
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receipt when the money or property is credited to his account, set
aside for him, or made available so that he could draw on it with
notice.50 Even where the taxpayer has no actual or constructive
receipt of money or property himself, actual or constructive receipt
by his agent is imputed to him. 5 1 In other words, for a transaction
to be legitimate under section 1031, the taxpayer cannot touch the
money paid for the sale of the relinquished property, nor can he
have his agent touch the money for him.
Enter the section 1031 swap through a qualified intermediary,
permitted under the Treasury Regulations, where the typical exchange involves: (1) the taxpayer; (2) the buyer of the relinquished
property; (3) the seller of the replacement property; and (4) the
now-infamous qualified intermediary. 52 In essence, the QI holds
onto the taxpayer's money from the sale of the relinquished property and pays it to the seller of the replacement property.
Here, the astute reader perceives a discrepancy. He thinks to
himself, "Isn't the intermediary's receipt of the taxpayer's money
the constructive receipt of funds to the taxpayer?" The Regulations state that it is not. The IRS created a safe harbor to shield
section 1031 exchangers from the dreaded constructive receipt of
funds-and inadvertently created a whole industry-by authorizing multiparty exchanges made through qualified intermediar53
ies.
Under the safe harbor, a qualified intermediary can touch the
money for the taxpayer without the taxpayer having to realize actual or constructive receipt of the funds. 54 How? The IRS states
that the qualified intermediary is not considered the agent of the
taxpayer.55 But the safe harbor vanishes at the moment the tax50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Cherry, supra note 17, at 242
53. See Lipton, supra note 24, at 79.
54. See Treas. Reg § 1.1031(k)-l(g)(4) (2002). Qualified intermediaries are typically
companies that are in business to make money by handling tax deferred exchanges. See
Cherry, supra note 17, at 242.
55. Treas. Reg § 1.1031(k)-l(g)(4)(i) (2002). The Regulation states:
In the case of a taxpayer's transfer of relinquished property involving a qualified intermediary, the qualified intermediary is not considered the agent of the
taxpayer for purposes of section 1031(a). In such a case, the taxpayer's transfer
of relinquished property and subsequent receipt of like-kind replacement property is treated as an exchange, and the determination of whether the taxpayer
is in actual or constructive receipt of money or other property before the taxpayer receives like-kind replacement property is made as if the qualified inter-

mediary is not an agent of the taxpayer.
Id. (emphasis added).
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payer has the "immediate ability or unrestricted right to receive,
pledge, borrow, or otherwise obtain the benefits of money ... held
5 6
by the qualified intermediary."
Regulation of the qualified intermediary industry is almost nonexistent. Under the Regulations, to be a valid QI, one must: (1)
enter into a written "exchange" agreement with the taxpayer; (2)
acquire the relinquished property from the taxpayer as required in
the agreement; (3) transfer the relinquished property; (4) acquire
the replacement property; and (5) transfer the replacement property to the taxpayer. 57 If he fulfills the aforementioned requirements, anyone can become a qualified intermediary; the industry
is not licensed or audited by any regulatory body. 58 Further,
qualified intermediaries currently face no bonding, insurance, or
59
minimum equity capitalization constraints.
In sum, the QI is a powerful tool that allows the taxpayer to
complete a multiparty swap with replacement property it has not
yet identified at the time the relinquished property is given up.
The regulations that created the QI industry allow for easy access
into the sector and provide no industry oversight. In the end, it is
taxpayers like Ms. Graham who suffer when the QI misappropriates the proceeds from the relinquished property. The issue is
whether Graham is taxed on the gain received-which was held by
her qualified intermediary-when she cannot complete the exchange because the QI misappropriated the proceeds needed to
buy the replacement property. Here, the tax jurisprudence that
flows from principal-agent misappropriation provides guidance.
III. THE RULES GOVERNING AN AGENT'S MISAPPROPRIATION OF
THE PRINCIPAL'S PROPERTY

As previously stated, gross income means all income from what60
ever source derived, including gains from dealings in property.
The Supreme Court has defined income as "undeniable accessions to
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete
dominion." 6' In cases dealing with an agent's misappropriation of his
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-l(g)(4)(vi) (2002).
57. Id. § 1.1031(k)-l(g)(4)(iii).
58. Choosing
a
SAFE
1031
Exchange
Qualified
Intermediary
(QI),
http://www.exeterco.com/Selecting-SAFEQualifiedIntermediary.aspx (last visited August
13, 2007).
59. Id.
60. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000).
61. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
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principal's funds, the tax treatment of the principal depends on
whether he had constructive receipt of the funds, and whether the
principal-agent relationship existed at the time of the misappropriation.
Generally, the receipt of funds by an agent is constructive receipt by his principal. 62 An exception to the general rule exists if
there is an unauthorized use of funds from which the principal
derives no benefit. 63 However, if the principal derives an economic
benefit from the agent's actions, the principal constructively receives the income even though the agent took unauthorized action
to his detriment. 64 Even if a corporate principal does not derive
an economic benefit from the unauthorized use of funds, it will
have gross income to the extent that the transaction consisted of
65
the normal activities of the corporation.
The timing of the misappropriation is also a factor. The issue is
whether the agent is considered an agent at the moment he mis62. See Md. Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 346-47 (1920).
63. See Alsop v. Comm'r, 290 F.2d 726, 728 (2d Cir. 1961), affg 34 T.C. 606 (1960). In
Alsop, the taxpayer discovered that her literary agent had been embezzling her royalties for
the past ten years. Alsop, 290 F.2d at 727. The taxpayer had not reported the royalties as
income because she was unaware that they existed. Id. After learning of foul play, the
taxpayer obtained judgments against the agent and she deducted embezzlement losses in
the amount of the judgments. Id. However, she did recover a portion of the money from
her agent, but did not report it as income. Id. The court determined that the taxpayer was
not able to take the deductions for the embezzlement losses because she never received the
income, and that the subsequent recovery of money from the agent was income in the year
received. Id. at 728-29.
64. See Donohue v. Comm'r, 323 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1963). In Donohue, an accountant
embezzled money from his client-a tavern owner-who was unaware of the embezzlement
until a later year. Donohue, 323 F.2d at 652. The Seventh Circuit noted that the embezzled money had been deposited in the cash register, used in the taxpayer's business, and
later embezzled. Id. The taxpayer argued that the money was income to the accountant in
the year of its receipt. Id. The court disagreed; it distinguished Donohue from Alsop because the taxpayer had an economic benefit from the receipt of the money in the cash register prior to the embezzlement. Id. Accordingly, the court ruled that the employer had
income in the year of receipt. Id. at 652-53. See also Sowell v. Comm'r, 302 F.2d 177, 17980 (5th Cir. 1962). In Sowell, the partial owner of an oil and gas lease pledged the lease
and assigned the income from it to obtain a loan, all without the knowledge or consent of
the co-owners. Sowell, 302 F.2d. at 178-79. All income that would have been paid to the
other owners was remitted to the bank in payment of the loan. Id. at 179. The other owners reported the income and corresponding depletion deductions, as well as a bad debt
deduction for the amounts remitted to the bank but not repaid to them on their returns. Id.
at 179. The IRS claimed that the owners did not have constructive receipt of the income
and as such were not entitled to report the income or the deductions. Id. The court determined that the owners did derive an economic benefit from the payment to the bank on the
loan because each payment increased the owner's equity in the lease and lessened the
bank's interest. Id. at 180.
65. See Asphalt Indus., Inc. v. Comm'r., 384 F.2d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 1967) (holding that
the corporate principal must include the funds embezzled by its president in gross income
because the transactions consisted of the normal activities of the corporation).
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appropriates the funds. If the purpose behind the principal-agent
relationship had been fulfilled, a subsequent misappropriation by
the so-called agent will not be attributed as income to the princi66
pal because the relationship had already ended.
Theoretically, the principal-agent relationship may also be terminated prior to its fulfillment if the agent breaches his fiduciary
duty to act loyally for the principal's benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship. Whether such a breach
would be seen as a termination of the agency relationship is unknown. 67
IV. THE ISSUE
Back to Ms. Graham. She had tax-deferred funds from the sale
of relinquished property that were held by a qualified intermediary, who misappropriated the funds before Graham could identify
and close on like-kind replacement property. The issue is whether
Ms. Graham has taxable income from the sale of the relinquished
property, and if so, to what extent and when.
66. See Rossi v. Comm'r, 41 B.T.A. 734 (1940). In Rossi, the taxpayer was a member of
a partnership that became insolvent. Rossi, 41 B.T.A. at 735. It assigned all of its assets to
an agent, who sold them and used the funds to settle with the partnership's creditors. Id.
However, in the subsequent year, the agent received a check payable to the partnership for
a tax refund. Id. at 736. The agent endorsed the check, deposited the money into the bank,
and used the funds for his own personal expenses. Id. The taxpayer had no knowledge of
the money and no additional payments were made to the partnership's creditors from the
funds. Id. The IRS argued that although the taxpayer had no knowledge of the money, the
funds were received by taxpayer's agent, so the income was taxable to taxpayer in the year
of agent's receipt. Rossi, 41 B.T.A at 737. The Board determined that the agency agreement between the partnership and the agent ended when the agent made final payments to
all of the partnership's creditors, because an agency agreement terminates when its purpose has been completed. Id. at 738. Thus, the taxpayer had no income. Id.
67. See Grant v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1995-29. In Grant, the taxpayers sought debt
consolidation due to financial troubles that followed their relocation from Alaska to Alabama. Grant, T.C. Memo at *1. Under the guise of debt consolidation, and without the
knowledge of the taxpayers, the agent cashed in the one of the taxpayers' retirement accounts and misappropriated the proceeds. Id. at *2. The Service notified the taxpayers of a
tax deficiency resulting from the nonpayment of income tax on the liquidation of one of the
accounts. Id. at *4. The issue was whether the unauthorized distribution of taxpayers'
pension fund to the agent-who misappropriated the funds--constituted gross income to
the taxpayers under § 61(a). The court expounded the general rule that the taxpayer has
no gross income where an agent receives and misappropriates funds for his own use, the
principal had no knowledge of the misappropriation, and the principal received no economic
benefit from the misappropriated funds. Id. at *4. However, a taxpayer will have gross
income where he had no knowledge of the misappropriated funds, but nevertheless, received some economic benefit from the funds. Grant, T.C. Memo at *4. Here, the court was

satisfied that the taxpayers had no knowledge of the agent's misappropriation, nor had
they received an economic benefit from it, so the taxpayers were not required to report
income from the agent's receipt of the retirement account proceeds. Id.
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Before plunging into the law, consider the theory behind taxation in general. Taxes are mainly used to pay for public services. 68
However, the imposition of a tax on an activity encourages people
engaged in Activity X to substitute Activity Y, which is less heavily taxed. 69 Inefficiency results because those people were more
productively employed in Activity X, otherwise no tax would have
been needed to induce them to switch from X to Y.70 Thus, taxes
result in a necessary reduction in the efficiency with which re71
sources are employed.
V.

ANALYSIS

Ms. Graham sold property. The selling price-or the amount
72
realized-was $3.5 million. Under sections 61(a) and 100173 of
the Code, Ms. Graham must pay income tax on the amount realized minus the price she paid--or the basis-which is adjusted
upward for improvements made and downward for depreciation
expenses deducted.
There is an exception. Ms. Graham held her property solely for
investment. As long as she exchanges it for like-kind property
under the rules of section 1031, Graham can delay paying taxes on
the gain. Note that she cannot avoid paying taxes altogether, because eventually she will not exchange the property; she will sell it
for property that is not of like kind, and when she does, the basis
she uses to compute her gain will be the basis of the first property
she exchanged. This brief illustration shows that the purpose of
section 1031 is all about liquidity. It allows Ms. Graham to productively exchange like-kind investment or business properties
and defer the taxable gain until the time comes when she has the
cash to pay the tax. In fact, section 1031 increases the efficiency
with which resources are employed because it keeps taxation of
the gain from interfering in the decision to reinvest.
Although it may not have been Congress' intent when it drafted
section 1031, the deferred multiparty exchange that Ms. Graham
has set in motion is permitted. Graham's transaction is multi68. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 223 (2nd prtg. 1974). Taxation is
also used by some as a device to change resource use and/or as a means to distribute
wealth. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 223-24.
72. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000) (defining what is gross income).
73. Id. § 1001 (determining the amount of gain or loss, generally).

Spring 2008

Qualified Intermediaries

505

party because there are more than two parties involved; she sold
the relinquished property to Buyer for $3.5 million and will buy
the replacement property from a to-be-determined Seller. 74 Graham's transaction is deferred because she did not simultaneously
exchange properties. 75 Perhaps the most important factor behind
the courts' consent of multiparty and deferred like-kind exchanges
was the idea that the taxpayer could not obtain actual or constructive receipt of the cash from the sale of the relinquished property. 76 So far so good for Ms. Graham; she is well on the way to a
tax-deferred exchange.
Remember, the IRS issued specific regulations that must be fulfilled in order to make a deferred exchange legitimate. Generally,
the QI must: (1) enter into a written exchange agreement with the
taxpayer; (2) acquire the relinquished property from the taxpayer
as required in the agreement; (3) transfer the relinquished property; (4) acquire the replacement property; and (5) transfer the
replacement property to the taxpayer. 77 In Ms. Graham's case,
the QI completed steps (1) - (3) and collected the proceeds from
the sale of the relinquished property, but lost Graham's money
before acquiring the replacement property.
For now, disregard whether Ms. Graham may still complete a
valid section 1031 exchange; she has bigger problems. The IRS
may argue that she must recognize as income the difference between her adjusted basis in the relinquished property and the $3.5
million that her QI received for it. The IRS could argue that Ms.
Graham had constructive receipt of the funds from the relinquished property even though her QI eventually misappropriated
them. Admittedly, the Treasury Regulations state that the taxpayer must treat a section 1031 exchange as a sale if he has constructive receipt of the replacement property funds, 78 and gener-

74. The Tax Court deemed that multiparty exchanges were legitimate under § 1031 in
Barker v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 555 (1980). See supra, section II.
75. The Ninth Circuit deemed that deferred exchanges were legitimate under § 1031 in
Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979). Congress acquiesced in 1984 by
enacting I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3), which gives the taxpayer forty-five days to identify the replacement and sixty days to close on it. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3) (2000).
76. Barker, 74 T.C. at 564-65.
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-l(g)(4)(iii) (2002).
78. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(0(1) (2002):
[In the case of a transfer of relinquished property in a deferred exchange, gain
or loss may be recognized if the taxpayer actually or constructively receives
money or other property before the taxpayer actually receives like-kind replacement property. If the taxpayer actually or constructively receives money
or other property in the full amount of the consideration for the relinquished
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ally, actual or constructive receipt of funds by the taxpayer's agent
79
is imputed to the taxpayer himself.
However-and this is a big however-the Regulations state that
a QI is not considered the taxpayer's agent in the context of a section 1031 exchange.80 There was no "exchange" in the case of Ms.
Graham, which opens the door for treating her as a normal seller
with an agent who collected $3.5 million in her name. Nevertheless, the plain language of the regulations does not require a consummated exchange in order to treat the QI as not being an agent:
"[i]n the case of a taxpayer's transfer of relinquishedproperty involving a qualified intermediary, the qualified intermediary is not
considered the agent of the taxpayer for purposes of section
1031(a)."81
However, the IRS could still argue that it is not trying to tax
Graham based on section 1031(a); it is taxing her under section
1001(a).8 2 Admittedly, Graham has not completed a like-kind exchange, and under any Code section other than section 1031, the
QI would be considered Graham's agent.
Under the Alsop and Donohue cases, the IRS could argue that
the intermediary's receipt of funds from the sale of Graham's
property is imputed to Graham and that she must pay income tax
on the difference between the sale price and the adjusted basis as
a result.83
Generally, the receipt of funds by an agent is constructive receipt by his principal,8 4 unless the principal derives no benefit
from the agent's use of his funds; but if the principal derives an
economic benefit from the agent's actions, he has constructively
received the income even though the agent took unauthorized action to the principal's detriment.8 5 Thus, whether or not Graham
property before the taxpayer actually receives like-kind replacement property,
the transaction will constitute a sale and not a deferred exchange.

Id.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id. § 1.1031(k)-l(f)(2).
See id. § 1.1031(k)-1(g)(4)(i).
Id. (emphasis added).
See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2000):
The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the
amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for
determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided in such section for determining loss over the amount realized.

I.R.C. § 1001(a).
83. See supra Part III for a discussion of the Alsop, Donohue, and Asphalt Indust. line
of cases.
84. Alsop, 290 F.2d at 728.
85. Donohue, 323 F.2d 651.
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is taxed will depend on how persuasive the IRS is in arguing that
she received an "economic benefit" when the QI accepted the funds
for the relinquished property. For example, if the intermediary
paid off an outstanding mortgage on the relinquished property or
made an investment gain on Graham's funds before losing them,
Graham could have to recognize ordinary income in the amount of
her economic benefit.86
VI. CONCLUSION

Would the IRS go after Ms. Graham, arguing that she should be
taxed under the economic benefit theory? It might, because the
IRS has public policy considerations for not adopting a favorable
position.
Currently, there is no oversight of qualified intermediaries.
They are not licensed, required to be bonded, insured, or meet
minimum capitalization requirements. Conversely, the majority
of states require real estate agents and contractors to be bonded
and insured as a condition of licensure. Arguably, similar requirements should be imposed on qualified intermediaries.
If the IRS were favorable in Ms. Graham's case, it would provide
an incentive to maintain the status quo. Qualified intermediaries
wishing to avoid bonding, insurance, and minimum capitalization
costs could point to the favorable treatment given to taxpayers
like Graham as a factor that lessens the impact of such losses.
Thus, by requiring a taxpayer like Graham to report the sale of
the relinquished property and claim a loss for the QI's theft or
misappropriation of the proceeds, the IRS would arguably be providing a service to the participants of like-kind exchanges.
However, the IRS had a chance to regulate the QI industry and
it chose not to.8 7 By pushing the entire QI industry into stricter
regulation, the acts of a few deadbeat intermediaries will drive up
like-kind exchange costs for all taxpayers.
It also seems far-fetched to believe that a QI could cite the favorable treatment of Ms. Graham to convince a potential client
that the exchange is less risky than it appears. Graham still lost
86. Also note that if Graham were imputed the income that her intermediary collected,
she would be unsuccessful arguing that the principal-agent relationship had already ended.
Generally, if the purpose behind the principal-agent relationship had been fulfilled, a subsequent misappropriation would not be attributed to Graham because the principal-agent
relationship had already ended. See Rossi, 41 B.T.A. 734.
87. As stated in Part II, supra, the qualified intermediary industry was created by the
IRS Treasury Regulations.
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the proceeds from the sale of her $3.5 million dollar property; the
only issue before the IRS is whether or not to tax her as if she sold
it. And don't forget that taxpayers are free to negotiate the terms
of their QI agreement, including a provision that the QI shall not
invest the proceeds, etc.
In short, the plight of Ms. Graham is a lesson to all like-kind exchangers to use due diligence in choosing an intermediary and in
negotiating the terms of the exchange agreement. To tax Graham
as a seller would be an inefficient way to spur the costly regulation of an industry; it would create inefficient barriers to taxpayers seeking to exchange via section 1031 all because of a few deadbeat intermediaries.
Matthew D. Haydo

